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Abstract
Since ethical concerns are calling for more attention within Operational
Research, we present three approaches to combine Operational Research models with
ethics. Our intention is to clarify the trade-offs faced by the OR community, in
particular the tension between the scientific legitimacy of OR models (ethics outside
OR models) and the integration of ethics within models (ethics within OR models).
Presenting and discussing an approach that combines OR models with the process of
OR (ethics beyond OR models), we suggest rigorous ways to express the relation
between ethics and OR models. As our work is exploratory, we are trying to avoid a
dogmatic attitude and call for further research. We argue that there are interesting
avenues for research at the theoretical, methodological and applied levels and that the
OR community can contribute to an innovative, constructive and responsible social
dialogue about its ethics.
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1.  Introduction:
We present three methodological approaches to combine ethics with
Operational Research. The first one is ethics outside OR models. It considers that OR
models should be objective and that the integration of subjective or ethical values
weaken the power and the scientific legitimacy of OR. The second approach is ethics
within OR models. It considers that the objectivity of OR models is illusory, ill-suited
to the social nature of the OR application domain, and that it may constitute a denial
of responsibility not to attempt to include subjective and ethical values within OR
models. The third approach is ethics beyond OR models. It considers that whatever the
model, there remain subjective and ethical values beyond it. OR then consists in
balancing OR models with the process of OR. It emphasizes the role of social
dialogue.
Our motivation for this caricature is twofold. First, we are not always
comfortable with possible consequences of integrating too much subjectivity within
the core methodology of OR. Although these attempts are full of good intentions, we
believe that OR legitimacy may be at risk since good intentions may not always apply
once these models are developed and used at a large scale. Second, we believe that
this opposition between objectivity and subjectivity may be more than a figure of
speech. We suggest for instance how it may constitute a meta-model with innovating
properties. Ethics beyond OR models could lead to a methodological approach that
links OR models to a rational and open discourse on the limitations of these models.
At a time when ethical concerns seem to grow among OR researchers, we
would contribute if we clarify some of the fundamental and difficult trade-offs that
our community must face and discuss. On the other hand, we are optimistic about the
finding of a rationale in the combination of OR with ethical concerns, as well as about
the effectiveness of concrete institutional and individual efforts to combine OR
models with an ethical practice.Page 3/15
2.  Ethics outside OR Models
Traditionally, models used in Operational Research have aimed at identifying an
optimal solution independent of the perceptions, appreciation and feelings of the
human beings. When this is the case, these models identify an “objectively optimal”
solution and any subjective value is abstracted. Objective models of Operational
Research exclude ethical concerns in order to ensure the formal validity of their
solution.
These objective models, like all models based on a maximization principle,
inherit from models of the natural sciences (For a history of OR/MS, see Corbett and
Van Wassenhove 1996; for the link with natural sciences, see Brans 2002, and for the
maximization principle, see Sen 1997). The natural sciences methodology aims at
understanding things independently of subjective values and provides OR models
with a scientific legitimacy. In natural science like in objective OR models, the ideal
is universal truth.
Not only are there no ethical concerns properly included within objective OR
models, there should be no ethical concerns within them. Otherwise, they would not
be objective anymore and would lose their scientific legitimacy. In an excellent book
about ethics and models, Wallace reports a large consensus of this position:
"One of the ethical responsibilities that was agreed upon is
that the goal of any model building process is objectivity with clear
assumptions, reproducible results, and no advocacy" (Wallace,
1994, p. 6)
This ideal position must be qualified. It has long been recognized that models of
natural sciences do not capture the entire real world. Modeling embeds a process of
abstraction that leaves out singular properties of real situations. This process is not
totally objective and is value-loaded. An honest effort from the model builder to make
the model as objective as possible is then presented as a deontological responsibility:
"Participants generally agree on some aspects of ethical
conduct, such as the need for model builders to be honest, to
represent reality as faithfully as possible in their models, to use
accurate data, to represent the results of the model as clearly asPage 4/15
possible, and to make clear to the model user what the model can do
and what its limitations are." (Wallace, 1994, p. 8)
If OR models are not perfectly objective, their ideal is to remain as objective as
possible, and this does not exclude deontological responsibilities of the model builder.
In principle, there is no incompatibility between “ethics outside OR models” and the
statement that OR actors should follow ethical rules or codes of conduct.
The critic of objective models is paradoxically methodological. The argument
resides in the nature of the social world as opposed to the natural world that inspired
objective OR models. Brans (2002, p. 342) recalls that:
"The main feature of the modeling of Natural Real World
situations is that the Physical Law remains unchanged and is
universally disseminated".
Human values, whatever they may be, are evolving and are locally specific.
Therefore, applying a Natural World modeling to the social world amounts to the
abstraction of the singularities of human beings, of societies, and of their evolutions.
In the social world, these human values are meaningful. They influence actual
decisions and therefore should be part of the methodological approach.
Hence, the main criticism is that objective OR models are based on a conception
of scientific methodology that does not properly reflect the specificity of social
sciences with respect to natural sciences, i.e. the fact that human beings have values
which are evolving and are local. There is a fundamental methodological inability of
objective OR models to integrate these specific concerns.
When we act in a social world, is it really ethical to abstract from social values?
Does this not amount to ignore ethics or to placing ethics at an inferior level, allegedly
less legitimate? By relegating human values outside the realm of scientific
methodology, objective OR models weaken the legitimacy of human values. Beyond
the methodological question thus resides an ethical one.
These ethical issues cannot be addressed by referring solely to the objectivity of
OR models. The claim of objectivity would appear as a denial of responsibility. Since
objectivity does not guarantee ethics, why not include ethics within OR models? What
would it mean to include ethical values within OR models? Would it be a guarantee of
a methodology more respectful of human values?Page 5/15
3.  Ethics within OR models
The integration of subjective concerns within OR models received a powerful
tool around the 1970s with the development of multi-criteria approaches (MCDA).
Although they are not the unique way to integrate ethics within OR models, we
illustrate our argument with this type of models (see Brans, 2002; Keeney and Raiffa,
1976; Roy and Bouyssou, 1993). In these models, there is no one single objective
function but several. How these functions combine (their respective weights), depends
on parameter values that are not determined by the objective functions themselves. In
this sense, the optimal solution depends on “subjective” weights and we hence call
these models “subjective”.
Theoretically, this distinction between objective and subjective can be elusive.
For a given set of weights, and with appropriate conditions on the combination of the
different attributes, the method amounts to the maximization of a function, be it
composed of several underlying functions or not. Indeed, the distinction in this case is
more of a practical nature. The need to measure the weights induces de facto difficult
measurement issues and an acknowledgement of the specificity of the situation at
hand. In this manner, a relationship between the model builder and the model user is
established. This relationship, which tended to be abstracted in the scientific
methodology of objective models, becomes integrated within the scientific
methodology of subjective OR models.
But the distinction can be theoretical too, for instance when subjective OR
models relax some necessary assumptions of objective models in an attempt to reflect
the difficulty of measuring the weights (say by using intervals). For instance, in the
Prometheus-Gaïa model, only intervals within which weights are deemed to remain
are measured and plugged in the model. For a given set of weights, these models do
not necessarily identify an optimal solution and when one is identified, it may not be
unique or attainable. Such a subjective model is theoretically “weaker” than objective
models. In practice, these models constitute an "aid" to decision-making rather than
an absolute criterion of rationality (e.g. Brans, 2002).
In the face of the growing interest for ethical concerns, the flexibility of these
models has led Professor Brans to propose that ethics could be treated as a specific set
of weights. While subjective weights would reflect subjective values of individuals,Page 6/15
ethical weights would reflect values at the level of society or humanity and in
particular sustainable development. Hence, this approach distinguishes a form of
"individual subjectivity" (the subjectivity of the decision-maker or the model builder)
from a "social subjectivity" that could be integrated within OR models to render them
more ethical. This allows Brans to balance objective, subjective and ethical concerns
3.
Some solutions can be optimal both from the subjective point of view and from the
ethical point of view. Otherwise, an ethical conflict arises, modeled by the
incompatibility of the two sets of weights.
Practically, ethical weights may be even more difficult to measure than
individually subjective weights. Brans proposes to have the weights determined by a
group of independent experts. This raises many questions: who then is going to
choose these experts? How are they going to agree on a set of weights? Is it realistic
to assume that any group of experts can ever measure ethical values to the point of
constituting a set of weights to be plugged in an OR model? Indeed, should we
succeed in forming such a committee, would it be the best use we could make of it?
Eventually, we may end up integrating ethical concerns within OR models by
outsourcing their measurement, which is the key of their influence. Like for
individually subjective considerations, integrating ethical concerns within OR models
assumes somehow a "good intention" on the part of the decision-maker, the analyst
and the (ethical) experts. Even with these models, considerations of an ethical nature
remain essentially outside of the model. Crucial elements are 1) the ability to properly
measure the subjective weights (individual), 2) the ability to have the ethical weights
properly measured (experts group), 3) the integration of these weights into the
objective core of the model, 4) the interpretation of the model when it does not
identify an optimal solution without ambiguity, 5) the good faith of all actors.
The assumption of good faith is of particular importance in the case of
subjective models. With subjective OR models, it is easier to construct a model that
legitimizes ex-post the selection of a solution identified ex-ante. The distortion of the
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same meaning. For reasons obvious in section 4, we want to avoid the reduction of
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model takes place in the choice of the weights and is difficult to detect. For someone
else than the decision-maker and the builder of the model, it may be impossible to
appreciate a possible manipulation. In the wrong hands, subjective models can be
strategic instruments to legitimize decisions through a distortion of scientific
methodology. From the point of view of objectivity, subjective models raise an
important question as to the scientific credibility of OR. We believe this trade-off to
be of great importance in the debate about ethics outside or within OR models.
Furthermore, this trade-off between objectivity and subjectivity may be an object of
scientific study in itself. This is discussed in the next section.
4.  Ethics beyond OR models
On one hand, excluding ethics from OR models is in itself an ethical position
and on the other hand, including ethics within OR models excludes some ethical
questions. Whatever the model is, i.e. whether it includes ethical considerations or
not, there will always remain ethical issues beyond the model. Is there a way to
combine a model with the ethical concerns that are necessarily beyond it? This is the
approach we term ethics beyond OR models.
One way to explore such an approach is to acknowledge the practical dimension
of OR (Fortuin, van Beek and Van Wassenhove, 1996). OR is not reduced to its
models and their analytical way to look at things. Therefore, it can be taken for
granted that “all models are incomplete” and that many considerations remain outside
of any model (Little, 1994, p. 179). One possibility to express this embedding of OR
models within a practical context consists in treating OR as the conjunction of a
model together with the relation between this model and reality (Figure 1). We argue
below that this approach to OR allows us to reflect a synthesis of the concepts evoked
in the preceding sections.Page 8/15
Real World OR Models
OR
Process
Figure 1: OR combining OR models and OR Process
By separating OR models from the real world, we make explicit the relation
between them. This relation, called the “OR process”, is a specific entity that is
neither within the model nor part of the real world. The process of OR is independent
from the real world as well as beyond the model.
In an earlier and exploratory methodological paper (Le Menestrel & Van
Wassenhove, 2001), we have suggested to relax the assumption that this relation
between a model and reality is invariant. In other words, for a given model and in a
given real situation, there may be many ways to relate the model with the reality (in
the words of Sen (1986), we relax “procedural invariance”). Further, these processes
may be valued in themselves as part of the practice of OR and independently of the
valuation of the different solutions identified by the model. Not only the result counts
but also the way it has been obtained and will be applied in practice.
For example, we evoked in section 2 a deontological responsibility of the model
builder with regard to the limitations of a model and thus referred to an ethical
valuation of the process of OR. In an objective approach that treats ethics outside OR
models, such a procedural valuation should be minimized and only the valuation of
the solutions within the models bears practical significance. In a subjective approach
that treats ethics within OR models, one attempts to embed a procedural valuation
within the substance of the model itself by broadening it. In both cases, the procedural
nature of this valuation is not treated specifically nor systematically. In objective and
subjective approaches to OR models, the intrinsic value of the process of OR is not an
integral part of the methodology. We suggest that there may be a heuristic power in
separating OR models from the process of OR and in studying their complementary
combination.Page 9/15
We have argued that two fundamental types of values are of importance in OR
as part of the social sciences. Values founded in regularities and expressed by laws
and values that are idiosyncratic to the situation at hand (Carrier and Wallace 1994).
This finds a natural formulation in the distinction between OR models and OR
process: OR models reflect the regularities and measure them; on the other hand, OR
processes are subject to an idiosyncratic valuation, specific to the situation at hand. In
other words, OR models correspond to the theoretical side of OR which attempts to
construct a measure as objective as possible of the different solutions that are
modeled. The OR process corresponds to the practical side of OR whose valuation
necessarily remains subjective because it is not captured in the model.
Of course, this separation between objective and subjective is relative. If, for a
given model, we can define the singularities outside of it as “all the properties of the
real world that are abstracted by the model”, some of these singularities may well be
included in another broader model. A property of the real world is not objective or
subjective per se: it depends on the model that is built to reflect it. The distinction
remains nevertheless relevant for all models. There will be characteristics of the real
world that will be modeled as regularities and others that will be left out as
singularities. Therefore, the combination of procedural, practical, idiosyncratic,
subjective values with substantive, theoretical, regularities-based, objective values is a
relevant issue, wherever the line is to be drawn. When we regroup different
characteristics of OR models (theoretical, objectively valued, etc.) to oppose them
with the process of OR (practical, subjectively valued, etc.) we are looking for some
sort of a “meta-model” that would characterize the methodology of OR as a social
science.
This meta-model may well take the form of the combination of a quantitative
and a qualitative valuation. Indeed, we may recall that the identification of regularities
when building a model has for primary purpose the quantification of the valuation of
the different solutions of the model (see Brans, 2002). It is thus natural to consider
that the process of OR, because it is not included within the model, remains
qualitative. In this sense, this approach beyond OR leads to the combination of a
quantitative and a qualitative dimension. A last section now discusses some
implications of this suggestion.Page 10/15
5.  Towards a Theory and an Ethics of Combining Qualities and
Quantities
In ethics beyond OR models, theoretical solutions implemented in practice seem
to receive a double valuation. A quantitative valuation that is objectively determined
by the model, and a qualitative one that reflects a given and singular point of view and
which originates in the practical process of implementing this solution in the real
world. When the quantitative measurement and the qualitative valuation coincide, this
procedural approach identifies one optimal solution that is both objectively and
subjectively optimal. When the quantitative measurement and the qualitative
appreciation do not coincide, this procedural approach does not identify a solution
that is both objectively and subjectively optimal. It reflects a dilemma. As a trade-off
between a quantitative and a qualitative valuation, such a dilemma between an OR
model and an OR process may well be a very specific type of trade-off.
Consider the following example. Suppose we can represent the quantitative
evaluation of each theoretical solution to an OR model by a quantitative scale: 1, 2, 3,
… .
4 Suppose further that we can represent the qualitative evaluation of each practical
implementation of a solution on a qualitative scale: 1
st, 2
nd, 3
rd, … . Note that the
qualitative scale is intuitive to reflect ethical concerns, but ethical concerns or part of
them may be also modeled within the quantitative scale, as discussed in section 3. We
want to minimize the quantitative valuation (it may, for instance, represent costs) and
favor the first ones of the qualitative valuation. Then, a solution with valuations (1,
1
st) is clearly optimal. It is better on the quantitative and qualitative sides (1<2 and
1
st>2
nd). However, a situation may well oppose a solution with valuations (1, 2
nd) and
a solution with valuations (2, 1
st). In such a case, the trade-off is irreducible and the
meta-model does not identify a solution that is optimal on both theoretical (OR
model) and practical grounds (OR process). Therefore, even though all solutions are
valued quantitatively as well as qualitatively, the combination of these valuations does
not necessarily lead to the identification of an optimal solution. Observe that it is not
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the objective model that is rendered more flexible through the consideration of
subjective qualitative valuations within it. It is its combination with a qualitative
valuation beyond it that renders the whole approach flexible. The natural conjunction
of the two types of valuations in the optimal case guarantees nevertheless that the
approach does not become arbitrary. A procedural approach to reflect the specificity
of each point of view on a given model may thus lead to innovative theoretical
research. This idea of combining a quantitative scale with a qualitative scale deserves,
we believe, more theoretical research.
From a more practical point of view, this approach suggests that analysts can
adopt an objective approach to OR models while still being able to give subjective
and ethical concerns the methodological place they deserve. Instead of looking for a
quantification of these concerns, the methodology would aim at making them explicit
through a discursive approach. In the words of Barabba (1994):
"Only through open discussion of the questions can model
assumptions and limitations – as well as values – be revealed and
assessed."
Indeed, the need for close and on-going communication between the model
builder and user was emphasized by Barraba (1994) and Little (1994). But we should
make it explicitly part of the methodology, and there are good reasons for this.
Indeed, the OR analyst has direct experience of the abstraction process that takes
place when constructing the model. Therefore, he should play a leading role in
rendering explicit the aspects of the situation that are not taken into account by the
model. In this manner, the OR analyst provides useful elements for subjective
valuation beyond the model. Further, given a qualitative valuation, he can make
explicit its combination with the quantitative evaluation of the model and identify
dilemmas or optimal solutions. The principle that the model should remain as
objective as possible offers a common measure for the discursive confrontation of the
different points of view. This would not be the case in a purely qualitative discursive
situation without any model to rely on. In a sense, we are trying to build on
communicational ethics as a bridge between theoretical and practical dimensions of
human behavior (Habermas, 1992). This is why we believe that keeping objective and
subjective considerations separated may help to combine OR with ethics.Page 12/15
We posit that our suggested approach is more realistic in order for OR
methodology to provide ethics the place it deserves. Suppose a group of experts is
formed to provide an independent ethical opinion on an energy choice for a business
actor. The analyst may have constructed a model to identify the solution that
minimizes costs. He may even have used a model to identify and quantify the
environmental impact of each solution. How should he rely on the expert group to
balance these two objectives? Would assessing relative weights for the expert group
guarantee an ethical decision? It may be more efficient to present the model(s), as
objectively as possible, as well as all the assumptions and the limitations already
identified. An open discourse could then allow the experts to point at some inherent
methodological limitations. For instance, for some solutions, we may not be able to
calculate the full environmental consequences, not even on a probabilistic basis. A
discursive approach would allow the experts to emit an opinion about the relevance of
conducting further research before acting in this case (precaution principle).
5 An
effective discursive process would allow considerations that are not taken into
account by the model to be made explicit and valued, even qualitatively. Finally, the
participants could propose a qualitative ordering of the solutions according to their
respect of the environment. Having such a consensus explicit or even public could
help the decision-maker to manage the trade-off between his goals and ethics. As the
actor, he would bear the responsibility of his choice. In this discursive approach, the
outcome is an explicit acknowledgment of the values beyond the model and
qualitative valuation process that does not weaken the objectivity of the model.
6.  Conclusion
We have presented three approaches to ethics and Operational Research: ethics
outside, within and beyond OR models. We have emphasized their distinctions but
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also their complementary character, trying to avoid a dogmatic approach that would
claim to be “the best” in all circumstances.
Our approach suggests some interesting avenues for research, in order to further
clarify the assumptions of the three approaches, but also, and more specifically, to
characterize the interaction between OR models and OR process. There are interesting
theoretical issues in combining quantitative and qualitative scales.
There is clearly a need for real-life case studies comparing the three different
approaches and showing their strengths and limitations. Since this touches upon social
sciences, we should learn empirically, by examples, if we wish to progress. Similarly,
we may learn from other disciplines (philosophy, ethics) and professions
(engineering, law, medicine) that have developed codes of ethical conduct long ago
and may show some similarities (engineering is model based but also applied to social
contexts as in man-machine interface design for instance). We may need to learn to be
more sensitive to cultural differences since ethics is about values that can be specific
to the individuals and society concerned.
There are also strong implications of the three approaches on the role and
behavior of the actors of OR: the analyst, the professional societies, etc. (see e.g. Leet
and Wallace, 1994). Consider analysts taking an oath of ethical conduct and being
backed up by their professional society when they disclose non-ethical use of OR.
Obviously, this would have big implications for the analysts, the society and the user
or decision-maker (see for instance Fienberg, 1994).
Ethical issues of Operational Research clearly deserve further work of
theoretical, methodological and applied nature. We should be pro-active in our OR
community instead of waiting until being “Enroned”…or being put in Andersen’s
situation.
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